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Army Expansibility

Mobilizing for Major War
Olen Chad Bridges and Andrée Navarro

ABSTRACT: Given recent developments in the strategic
environment and the heightened emphasis on readiness by senior
US Army leaders, the Army must assess its ability to mobilize the
force rapidly in the event of a major conflict. This article identifies
some critical elements of the mobilization process that are currently
deficient and require greater attention for the Army to execute a
short-notice, full-scale mobilization.

A

t present, it is unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire
military as quickly as it might like to. More importantly, it is
unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire military as
rapidly as it might need to in the event of a major war. The US Army has
only conducted total mobilization twice in the last one hundred years.
Both instances, World War I and World War II, are almost beyond living
memory. Historically, the US Army has been unprepared when called
upon to mobilize and expand. Even recent small-scale conflicts such
as Iraq and Afghanistan revealed gaps in the US Army’s mobilization
capabilities and its readiness.1
Moreover, the National Commission on the Future of the Army
recently highlighted the Army’s lack of a total mobilization plan
and recommended it develop one by September 30, 2017.2 Given the
increased emphasis the Department of Defense and the Department of
the Army have placed on the mobilization process, this article discusses
some key findings from research conducted by students of the US Army
War College regarding the potential impact of nondeployable soldiers
and the status of mobilization force generation installations (MFGIs).
Senior Army leaders have recently noted numerous deficiencies in
the readiness to fight a major war. Some senior officials have gone so far
as to say a “ready” Army cannot exist until at least 2020; others claim
2021–23 is a more reasonable time frame to “restore sufficient readiness.”3
The central problem is the Army’s present low level of readiness. For
instance, Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley testified:

1      Institute for Defense Analyses, Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the
Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses,
2      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Report to the President and the Congress
of the United States, January 28, 2016 (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2016), 80.
3      Army G-3/5/7, “Army Readiness Guidance,” US Army, May 19, 2017, https://www.Army
.mil/standto/2016-05-19; and Hearing on Readiness before the House Armed Services Committee SubCommittee on Readiness, 115th Cong. (March 8, 2017) (Statement of Lieutenant General Joseph
Anderson, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, US Army; Lieutenant General Aundre Piggee, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-4, US Army; and Lieutenant General Gwen Bingham, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Installation Management, US Army).
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about a third of our Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs] are
currently ready for high-end combat against a nation state. . . . Our goal is
to have Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams achieve 60–66 percent full
spectrum readiness, and I estimate that it will take the Army approximately
four years to achieve that assuming no significant increase in demand and
no sequestration levels of funding.4

Former Army Vice Chief of Staff General Daniel Allyn likewise
assessed, “about two-thirds of the Army’s initial critical formations are
at acceptable levels of readiness to conduct sustained ground combat
in a full spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or
near-peer adversary.”5 Moreover, only one-third of the brigade combat
teams, one-fourth of the combat aviation brigades, and one-half of the
division headquarters were deemed ready for combat in early 2017.6
Since a crucial step toward readiness for more than half the Army is
mobilization, the Army has begun to reexamine its mobilization plans.
Clearly, every delay in aligning personnel requirements with updated
matériel, such as “long-range precision fires, air and missile defense,
Armored BCTs, and aviation,” would increase the risk of “losing
overmatch in every domain” to our peer or near-peer competitors.7
This challenge has become even more acute because the Army’s senior
leadership now believes “conflict between nation-states is ‘virtually
guaranteed at some point.’ ”8

Total Force Mobilization

For the past 14 years, most mobilization requirements were
handled by the president’s partial mobilization authority, which can
activate up to 1,000,000 members of the Army Reserve for a period
not to exceed 24 consecutive months. A congressional authorization
for full mobilization, calling-up all of the existing active and reserve
components for the duration of a declared war, has not been needed and,
hence, has not been tested.
It now seems conceivable that a full mobilization is more probable
than at any time since the Cold War. During a strategic-level wargame
held in November 2016, participants gained “awareness of related
challenges and innovative approaches to mitigate those challenges.”9
Scenarios concerning deliberate mobilization, contingency mobilization,
and defeat-deny-defend mobilization revealed more than a few problem
4      Hearing on Military Services Challenges Meeting Readiness, Modernization, and Manning under Current
Budget Limits, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. 3–4 (September 15, 2016) (statement of General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, United States Army).
5      Hearing on the Department of the Army 2017 Budget Request and Readiness, 114th Cong. 4 (February
26, 2016) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army).
6      Hearing on the State of the Military, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. 4
(February 7, 2017) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army).
7      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Generating Force Analytics: Briefing
to the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2015); Hearing to Receive
Testimony on the Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017 and
the Future Years Defense Program, 114th Cong. (April 5, 2016), 15; Hearing on Readiness, 5; and State of
the Military, 6.
8      Mark A. Milley, “Future War is ‘Almost Guaranteed’,” (speech, Dwight David Eisenhower
Luncheon, Association of the United States Army, Walter E. Washington Convention Center,
Washington, DC, October 4, 2016) quoted in Joshua Urness, “Milley Addresses Attendees of AUSA
Meeting,” Fires Bulletin (November-December 2016): 4.
9      Ken Gilliam, “Full Mobilization Wargame,” Collins Center Update 18, nos. 3 & 4 (April–
September 2016): 4.
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areas regarding full and total response requirements. One of these is the
status of nondeployable soldiers. Another is the state of mobilization
force generation installations; most are inactive and might require
substantial time and resources before they can assume operations.

The Army’s Deployability Challenge

During both World Wars, conscription enabled the US Army to
expand greatly to play critical roles in defeating large-scale aggression.
For both political and practical reasons, Congress abolished the military
draft in 1973, and transitioned to a large-standing all-volunteer force
(AVF). Despite early problems, the AVF became an effective fighting
force expansible, when necessary, by no more than a partial mobilization.
The all-volunteer force has not yet, however, had to confront a great
power. That inexperience does not mean the force will not be successful;
it simply means we are moving into uncharted territory, territory that
will likely require full and possibly total mobilization.
As much as 40 percent of a mobilized total Army may not be ready
for a specific contingency. Medical conditions may prevent as many as 10
percent of soldiers from responding to a conflict.10 Another 13 percent
may be Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students.11 And, 16 percent
of soldiers, the minimum strength recommended by the National
Commission on the Future of the Army, comprise the generating force
“whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational
Army’s capabilities.”12
Of the deployable force, at least 182,000 soldiers (18 percent) cannot
be expected to mobilize during a major war due to the Army’s global
commitments to combatant commanders in at least 140 locations.13 In
2017, for example, 5,000 soldiers were deployed to the Middle East, 8,000
were in Afghanistan, 33,000 were in Europe, and nearly 80,000 were
in the Pacific.14 Although some global commitments, such as theater
security cooperation exercises, would be reduced during a major war,
not all of these requirements could be eliminated. Even increasing the
Army’s size to 2,000,000 soldiers would mean approximately 360,000
soldiers would become part of the generating force.
Furthermore, should regional actors attempt to take advantage
of America’s involvement in one major conflict, the Army would be
required to support combatant commanders in shaping their respective
theaters, as well as providing enough presence to assure America’s allies
and partners.

10      Hearing on the Quality of Life in the Military, Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military
Construction, Veteran’s Affairs and Related Agencies, 114th Cong. 6 (February 26, 2016) (statement of
Sergeant Major of the Army Daniel A. Dailey).
11      Scott Arnold et al., Non-Deployable Soldiers: Understanding the Army’s Challenge (strategy research
project, US Army War College, 2011).
12      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Generating Force Analytics: Briefing
to the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2015), 3–4; and Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Generating Force Study: Innovation and Adaptation in Support to
Operations, Pamphlet 525-8-1 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 2010).
13      Hearing on the State of the Military, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. 1
(February 7, 2017) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army).
14      Ibid.
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Mobilization Force Generation Installations

Mobilization force generation installations are responsible for
providing power projection, combat preparation, postmobilization
training, and other capabilities that support the Army’s readiness for
war, contingencies, and national emergencies. Although mobilization
and deployment are distinct activities, they intersect at the MFGIs,
which are identified as essential power-projection platforms. These
platforms “strategically deploy one or more high priority active
component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority
Army reserve component units.”15 Thus, MFGIs are doubly critical.
The United States had 25 designated MFGIs before the military
drawdown in Afghanistan during 2014. Of these, 7 primary installations
were federally-activated, state-operated, and designated for continuous
support, which included combat training center events. The 5 secondary
installations, which are inactive, maintained equipment sets and provided
postmobilization support for reserve components. The remaining 13
were used to support postmobilization training for reserve component
units. Indeed, of the 25 designated MFGIs, the Army now relies solely
on only two active primary installations to train and validate active and
reserve components.16 Hence, without due preparation, there will not be
enough MFGIs to enable the Army to conduct a short-notice, large-scale
mobilization, such as responding to a national emergency.
To be sure, efforts are underway to define, identify, and prioritize
power-projection platforms, aerial ports of embarkation, and MFGIs
in the conflicting organizational publications to support no-notice
deployment operations that would be necessary during a major war. But,
more needs to be done.

Low Likelihood, High Consequence

Admittedly, the likelihood of a major war is low. But, the risks are high
and the potential consequences of delayed and inefficient mobilization
are severe. The Army’s routine, predictable mobilization apparatus has
worked well during more than a decade of rotational deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the event of a total mobilization, however, the
Army may be expected to double or triple its size in quick order, and the
defense industrial base may be asked to respond in-kind.
When America is called to execute a war plan to defend against a
great power, or a bundle of war plans to respond to multiple threats,
an updated and robust mobilization plan must be in place to direct the
command and control element as well as the rapid expansion of the
MFGIs. The structure must identify and incorporate all of the force
enablers—including the reserve component capabilities such as support
groups, medical units, and postal units—required to operate the MFGIs.
These units must maintain high levels of readiness to ensure they can
mobilize on short notice. Essentially, a standing mobilization task force
15     “Power Projection Platform,” Global Security, May 7, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/facility/ppp.htm.
16      Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 Training Directorate (DAMO-TR), RC
Capability and Capacity Analysis, Line of Effort #3-Installation Capability and Capacity (Washington, DC:
DAMO-TR, November 18, 2016), briefing slides.
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structure must already be monitoring readiness and ready to assume
command and control during total mobilization.
Failure to prepare MFGIs, or to plan for the time needed to return
them to operational status, will put the Army on the path to repeating
the mistakes of previous wars and potentially losing the first battles.17
While the likelihood of a total mobilization may be low, the high risks
and severe consequences of failing to plan for it are real. Mobilization
must be a clear priority. The Army has not mobilized a large force that
required standing up new MFGIs since 2003. The current reliance
on predictable, rotational deployment procedures will not provide an
effective short- or no-notice response in a major war. Deliberate planning
efforts must be made to determine the proper training equipment sets
and appropriate temporary or permanent MFGI facilities to support
mobilizing units adequately. The current mind-set of the unlikelihood
of short-notice, large-scale mobilization must change.
Assessments of the Army’s ability to support a full mobilization
must be transitioned to mobilization planning efforts based upon war
plans containing detailed time-phased force deployment data. Limited
defense planning guidance scenarios that dictate assumptions-based
forces during mobilization planning exercises should be replaced by
realistic force-strength data from combatant commanders’ responseplanning requirements. Comprehensive mobilization planning should
include major war scenarios that involve competing requirements
across multiple theaters of operation and warfighting domains to build
a realistic, executable mobilization plan.

Recommendations

Forces Command currently has the implied task of working
concurrently with mobilization enterprise partners that include Army
Installation Management Command, Army Materiel Command, Army
Medical Command, Army Commands, Army Service Component
Commands, Army Agencies, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army
National Guard. Within this structure and as part of a new standing
mobilization task force, the Army should designate several full-time
mobilization planners who conduct full-scale, ongoing assessments
to include examining the private sector’s ability to expand rapidly the
capacity of each MFGI. These planners could develop and maintain
mobilization plans, which include a short- or no-notice mobilization plan
for a large force, as well as plan and oversee rehearsal of concept drills
and mobilization exercises to test and refine installation mobilization
plans. Mobilization planners would also be responsible for capturing
lessons and insights throughout the process to help the lead command
prioritize mobilization, training, and deployment of both active and
reserve components based on their priority of need.
Additional and periodic wargames, exercises, and simulations
across the Army’s mobilization enterprise—similar to commandpost Warfighter Exercises that ensure corps, division, and brigade
headquarters’ staff can perform their wartime missions—should be
17      Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons
from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, VA: JCOA, 2012); and R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Military
Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Atlantic, June 11, 2012.
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used to identify gaps, seams, and challenges that can be mitigated. The
Army should not expect the mobilization enterprise to be as responsive
as needed if it does not routinely exercise or resource it.
Because total mobilization of the Army will not occur in isolation,
active data collection efforts should integrate other services. Exercise
Nifty Nugget-78, which estimated “400,000 troop ‘casualties,’ and
thousands of tons of supplies and 200,000 to 500,000 trained combat
troops would not have arrived at the identified conflict scene on time,”
serves an illustrative example because the lessons and insights resulted
in the Department of Defense Master Mobilization Guide (1989) and the Joint
Deployment Agency, a forerunner to Transportation Command.18

Conclusion

With gradual and persistent attention, these tools can not only
increase the information available to today’s leaders but also provide
data useful to future decision makers: information from such exercises
can help leaders identify, develop, and implement a systematic, parallel,
enterprise-level planning process for total mobilization throughout the
Army and update the Army’s doctrinal publications as well as support
Defense Department efforts to update the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide used by the Joint staff, military departments, and other
defense agencies.
Greater understanding of US military capabilities and limitations
can reduce force-response times and lead to better support to combatant
commanders. The requirement should be to expand planning
perspectives, incorporating more scenarios in which there is active
competition for limited military resources. To reiterate, planning for
US military success should be based on information from realistic
enterprise-level exercises.
Historically, major wars have been the exception not the norm;
however, they are not extinct. The all-volunteer force has never fought
a conflict requiring a full mobilization on short- or no-notice. It is,
therefore, not safe to assume today’s Army can successfully prosecute
such a conflict. The actual deployable size of the one-million-soldier
Army makes it a high-risk force to meet Defense Planning Guidance
requirements.19 Therefore, Army leaders must continue to examine and
to update policies for improving the management and readiness of its
additional manpower pools. Realistic mobilization planning and exercises
to mitigate low readiness levels and to reduce delays in operational
planning timelines are imperative to success. Much more important,
however, is achieving the capability to integrate and synchronize the
total Army so it is ready for all conflicts, including a major war.

18      Danita L. Hunter, United States Transportation Command, 10 Years of Excellence, 1987–1997
(Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM). JP 4-05 references the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide, as “the first level of mobilization planning.” See also, DoD, Master Mobilization
Plan, 1.
19      Hearing on 2017 Budget Request and Readiness.
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